★ Must-know
Chaque soir, des passeurs djiboutiens conduisent une centaine de migrants éthiopiens depuis les plages du nord de Djibouti vers des navires à destination du Yémen, puis de l’Arabie saoudite.
Les biens de contrebande comprennent: des motos, du khat, des drogues, des produits alimentaires, des produits technologiques, des armes légères, notamment des kalachnikovs, des revolvers et des pistolets
Les armes débarquées sur les plages djiboutiennes sont prises en charge par des passeurs, acheminées vers la frontière éthiopienne par l’itinéraire des migrants, puis redistribuées en Éthiopie aux commanditaires.
Entre 2007 et 2020, plus d’un million deux cent mille Éthiopiens ont utilisé des réseaux de passeurs pour traverser illégalement le nord de Djibouti, Bab el-Mandeb et le Yémen afin de rejoindre l’Arabie saoudite. - Lauret, 2022
📌 Le trafic d’armes du Yémen vers l’Éthiopie emprunte en sens inverse la route migratoire via les territoires afars du nord de Djibouti, mais il reste épisodique, contrairement au trafic de migrants.
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Les commanditaires comprennent:
Les migrants éthiopiens rejoignent l’Arabie saoudite pour y trouver des emplois souvent précaires et mal rémunérés que les Saoudiens ne souhaitent plus exercer.
Selon les passeurs djiboutiens interrogés, les traversées maritimes transportaient au maximum une centaine de kalachnikovs et les livraisons dépendaient des besoins et des événements politiques régionaux.
Les migrants vont vers l’est ; les armes repartent vers l’ouest.
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📌 La crise renvoie à la fois à krisis, moment de rupture et de changement profond et inattendu, et à kairos, choix et moment opportun d’agir, selon Hartog (2020).
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📌 L’État yéménite est décrit comme en faillite, tandis que l’État éthiopien peine à contrôler ses périphéries somaliennes et afares.
La crise est à la fois rupture (krisis) et moment d’action (kairos).
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Instability on one shore creates opportunities for illicit exchange on the other.
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Eritrea gained independence in 1993, leaving Ethiopia without access to the Red Sea; renewed hostilities from 1998 to 2000 led to severed relations and a closed border until the late 2010s.
Rural overpopulation, dwindling water and land resources, and social tensions encouraged rural-to-urban movement and migration attempts, while demand for sponsored jobs was overtaken by labor supply; a transnational smuggling economy then developed from 2007, first between Ethiopia and Djibouti and later extending to Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Smuggling networks charged 1,000 to 1,500 dollars, financed through family or tontine contributions or loans from pawnbrokers who checked family solvency; this cost made migration to Saudi Arabia most accessible to Habesha families, especially Amhara and Tigrayan populations.
United Nations data recorded 11,000 maritime crossings of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in 2006, nearly 30,000 in 2007, and more than 100,000 in 2011; Djiboutian smugglers then maintained an average of over 100,000 Ethiopian crossings annually during the 2010s. - Nations unies
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The collapse of the Ethiopian Empire in 1974 led to the establishment of the authoritarian Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, known as the Derg.
The Eritrean war of independence lasted from 1961 to 1991, gradually became a civil war during the 1980s, and ended with the violent fall of the Derg in 1991.
In 1991, Saudi Arabia expelled more than one million Yemeni workers because Yemen had supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, opening opportunities for illegal Ethiopian migration to the kingdom. - Bonnefoy, 2017
An Ethiopian shepherd in Saudi Arabia earned four to five times as much as a federal government employee in Ethiopia.
The eastern Ethiopian migration route linked smugglers across four states, moving migrant convoys between relays in weeks rather than the several months typical at the start of the 1990s.
Examples of conflicts included (Tamru, 2022):
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Throughout the twentieth century, Yemen, divided into North and South, served as a hub for arms trafficking in the southern Red Sea.
Après l’unification du Yémen en 1990, la marginalisation politique des élites du Sud et l’accaparement de ses ressources pétrolières par des élites proches d’Ali Abdallah Saleh contribuent à la guerre civile de 1994, qui s’achève quatre mois plus tard par la victoire du Nord et la réaffirmation de l’unification. - Mermier, 2018
Les discours politiques d’Hussein al-Houthi contribuent aux six guerres de Saada, de 2004 à 2010, entre ses partisans et le gouvernement yéménite.
En septembre 2014, les Houthis prennent Sanaa puis conquièrent la côte ouest et la plaine de la Tihama, mais échouent à prendre Aden ; au printemps 2015, l’intervention de la coalition menée par l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis sauve le gouvernement en exil.
Une décennie après l’intervention de 2015, le conflit a fait près de 400 000 victimes directes ou indirectes et les Houthis contrôlent un État paria sur la scène internationale. - Lauret, 2024
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In the early twentieth century, the French colonial administration profited from an arms and ammunition trade from Djibouti City to Yemen.
After the Second World War, the Italians’ departure prompted extensive arms smuggling from imperial Ethiopia to North Yemen during its 1960s civil war between supporters of the imamate and the republic.
After the British protectorate ended, South Yemen became a socialist republic supported by the USSR, and extensive arms deliveries helped destabilize regional regimes considered enemies.
From the 1970s, Eritrean fishermen obtained weapons in South Yemen for rebel groups fighting Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie and later the socialist Mengistu.
Durant la guerre civile djiboutienne de 1991 à 1994, les rebelles afars du FRUD récupèrent des stocks d’armes, dont une fraction est revendue au Yémen par des rebelles démobilisés.
Le gouvernement yéménite affirme que les rebelles houthis reçoivent des armes de l’Iran afin de discréditer leurs revendications.
Après l’éviction d’Ali Abdallah Saleh en 2012, son successeur Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi peine à contenir les Houthis, les indépendantistes du Sud et les milices islamistes extrémistes, dont Al-Qaïda dans le Sud-Est yéménite.
Unification, guerres de Saada, prise de Sanaa : les conflits se succèdent.
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En 2007, le Small Arms Survey place le Yémen au deuxième rang mondial pour le nombre d’armes à feu civiles par habitant, avec environ 54,8 armes pour 100 habitants.
Les Houthis reçoivent un soutien militaire iranien acheminé par les ports somaliens, tandis que les prises d’armes dans les casernes yéménites et sur les troupes vaincues de la coalition alimentent le marché. - Guiziou, 2023
À partir du milieu des années 2010, des dalals éthiopiens commandités par des parrains politiques de l’Afar, du Tigré ou de l’Amhara négocient des armes auprès de dalals yéménites, puis font appel à des passeurs djiboutiens pour les faire transiter vers l’Éthiopie.
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La vénération des armes dans la société yéménite contribue à faire du pays un arsenal régional, tendance renforcée par le conflit actuel.
Sur certains marchés informels yéménites, une kalachnikov d’occasion coûte au plus une vingtaine de dollars et une arme de poing environ une dizaine de dollars.
La révolution et la guerre civile yéménite de 2014 affaiblissent l’État et ses institutions régaliennes, notamment l’armée, facilitant l’accès des trafiquants aux armes.
L’effondrement des institutions yéménites facilite l’accès aux armes et leur circulation.
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Les armes débarquées sont transportées par des passeurs djiboutiens ou des dalals éthiopiens, en cargaisons de moins de cent pièces, puis traversent le nord de Djibouti vers trois heures du matin en suivant l’itinéraire inverse des migrants jusqu’au lac Assal et en bifurquant vers Bahlo, moins surveillé que Galafi.
Les routes de l’illicite traversent des régions afar de Djibouti et d’Éthiopie, historiquement marginalisées et difficiles à contrôler, ce qui favorise le développement d’activités illicites.
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Les convois de migrants entrent à Djibouti par Galafi, passent par les relais de Yoboki et de Tadjourah jusqu’à Dalaï, puis sont conduits par les passeurs d’Obock vers les plages djiboutiennes.
Au début du XXe siècle, l’administration coloniale française, établie à Djibouti Ville, peine à contrôler l’arrière-pays en raison de ses moyens militaires limités et de l’influence d’intermédiaires protecteurs comme Abou-Bakr Ibrahim et sa famille. - Fontrier, 2003
La route des esclaves reliant l’Abyssinie au Yémen et au Hedjaz par Tadjourah prospère jusqu’à la veille de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. - Dubois, 2013
Galafi est surveillé ; Bahlo l’est moins.
Abou-Bakr Ibrahim (approximately 1810–1885) was an Afar notable and trader who made his fortune in the slave trade and helped establish the French presence around the Gulf of Tadjourah in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Abou-Bakr Ibrahim’s great-grandson Ali Aref Bourhan was vice-president of the Government Council from 1960 to 1966 and supported continued French presence during African decolonization.
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The ruling sub-clan captured most state revenue from leasing land to foreign armies and from port activity, restricting other clans and ethnic groups, including the Afars, who make up 30% of the population, and the Yemenis.
A civil war between the Afar rebel group FRUD and the Djiboutian government lasted from 1991 to 1994.
In 1994, some FRUD rebels laid down their arms in exchange for a promised decentralization and autonomy that was never implemented; former leaders received largely ceremonial administrative positions, while other rebels continued armed struggle in the far north.
Since the civil war, marginalization in northern Djibouti and the hinterland has encouraged survival economies, including migrant smuggling, whose brokers can become locally successful and courted figures despite the activity being legally prohibited. - Lauret, 2023
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Djibouti gained independence in 1977, but this did not change the peripheral status of Afar territories.
Hassan Gouled Aptidon governed from 1977 to 1990, and Ismaïl Omar Guelleh has governed since 1999; both presidents came from the same Somali clan.
Exclusion from power → civil war → persistent marginalization and illicit survival economies
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To avoid waiting for payment, Djiboutian smugglers and Yemeni dalals may agree to exchange a specified number of migrants for goods that the Yemenis will deliver on their next crossing.
During the 2010s, regional currencies fluctuated or depreciated: the Yemeni rial reportedly lost up to ten times its value, the Ethiopian birr was devalued repeatedly, and the Djiboutian franc and Saudi riyal circulated little beyond their national borders.
The dollar was used for a time in hawala transfers, but the transfers could involve thousands of dollars daily and required careful division into smaller transactions to avoid attracting authorities’ attention.
Unstable currencies lose ground; migrants become a stable, exchangeable standard
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Djiboutian smugglers report exchanges of around 100 Kalashnikovs for several hundred migrants and of a crate of small-calibre weapons for a few dozen migrants; precise equivalence data are often unavailable.
Most smugglers in Djibouti lack bank accounts, and tontine systems are generally unavailable to them because their income comes from illicit activity.
🔄 Yemeni dalals arrange delivery in three steps:
From the beginning of the 2010s, Ethiopian and Djiboutian smugglers acquired several dozen vehicles for transporting migrants and for their own daily travel.
Barter spread access to vehicles, motorcycles, and technology products in peripheral regions and partly improved local acceptance of migrant smuggling, although that acceptance remained limited by the distinction between people-smuggling and arms-trafficking.
Financial restrictions → barter → goods reach peripheral regions
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📌 Some Djiboutian smugglers distinguish migrants, who choose to migrate and pay smuggling networks, from weapons, which they associate with death and the means of causing it.
📌 Some smugglers or Ethiopian and Yemeni dalals transport weapons, while others refuse on moral, ethical, or religious grounds.
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Migrants choose migration; weapons embody the capacity to cause death
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From the middle of the 2010s, around 20 Djiboutian networks competed for migrants supplied by Ethiopian dalals, with more than 10 networks in Tadjourah alone.
Arms trafficking helped networks secure privileged relationships with Ethiopian dalals who placed orders and Yemeni dalals who delivered weapons, thereby sustaining their business and a minimum supply of migrants.
Political intermediaries intervened with police or gendarmerie when vehicles were stopped and vouched for smugglers to secure their release before extradition to Gabode prison in Djibouti City.
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Djiboutian networks competed by adjusting prices, negotiating the economic value assigned to migrants, and sometimes varying service quality, including food and rest time.
Political protectors could include:
In exchange for political protection, smugglers could become executors of the economic operations of political or administrative figures, using their transnational networks and logistics across four states.
Political protection → fewer arrests → continued arms transit
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The protector may also be the arms-trade sponsor
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Domestic demand for weapons amid growing crises contributes to destabilization, including the development of rural Afar and Amhara (Fano) militias.
In the Awash Valley, Afar and Somali pastoralists turned to militias amid land rivalries over access to water and pasture, and resource scarcity led opposing militias to encroach on each other's lands and border villages.
Growing instability and multiple fronts displaced rural populations toward cities, creating new potential migrants to Djibouti and the Arabian Peninsula.
They may be forcibly recruited for:
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In Ethiopia, dalals receive weapons and redistribute them to merchants supplying domestic demand, especially among shepherds and farmers in peripheral or rural areas.
Weapons may also reach intermediaries close to locally or regionally influential politicians, who use them to arm paramilitary groups or local militias for their own political agendas.
According to Djiboutian smugglers interviewed on the subject, weapons from Yemen were used in the Awash Valley conflict, the Tigray civil war, and the Fano militia insurgency.
📌 Yemeni arms appear to have had less impact in the Tigray war, where heavy weapons and artillery were important, than in some other conflicts.
📌 The exchange of insolvent migrants in Yemen is described as commodification of migrants rather than a resurgence of slavery.
Arms deliveries fuel instability, which sustains illicit routes
Take a 11-question practice quiz on Arms Trafficking Around the Red Sea, with every answer explained.
1. A field team observes the regular evening movement of migrants from northern Djibouti. Which route and destination pattern should it expect?
2. After weapons are unloaded on a Djiboutian beach, which sequence describes their onward movement to their intended recipients?
Memorize the key concepts of Arms Trafficking Around the Red Sea with 10 flashcards.
How many Ethiopian migrants do Djiboutian smugglers take toward Yemen each evening?
About one hundred.
Which goods do Yemeni vessels smuggle into Djibouti?
Motorcycles, khat, drugs, food, technology products, and small arms.
Which two meanings of crisis does Hartog (2020) distinguish?
Krisis means rupture and profound, unexpected change; kairos means an opportune moment and choice to act.
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